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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALEEN R. HYDE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 
: 14064 
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, 
Driver License Division, : 
Department of Public 
Safety, State of Utah, : 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
T h i s a p p e a l c o n c e r n s t h e l e g a l i t y o f a d r i v e r ' s 
l i c e n s e r e v o c a t i o n u n d e r t h e U t a h I m p l i e d C o n s e n t Law, U t a h 
Code A n n . § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , a s a m e n d e d . 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On the 23rd day of September, 1974, respondent 
revoked appellant's license to drive for the latter's alleged 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
failure to submit to a sobriety test under Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44.10 (1953), as amended. Pursuant to the provisions 
of• the Act, the respondent properly held an administrative 
hearing and determined that a refusal had occurred. 
Pursuant to the revocation, appellant timely filed 
a request for hearing de novo in the District Court of Weber 
County for a determination of whether appellantfs license was 
subject to revocation. The case was heard before the Honorable 
Calvin Gould, Judge of the Second Judicial District Court, in 
and for Weber County, on the 7th day of March, 1975. Judge 
Gould found that the appellant was the subject of a proper arrest 
on probable cause, and that she was requested to take a chemical 
test under the Implied Consent Law, and that the response given 
by her, her actions, and her failure to affirmatively indicate 
either in word or action that she would take either of the two 
requested tests, constituted a constructive refusal. Judge 
Gould sustained the action of the Driver License Division, 
respondent herein, and her petition for restoration of license 
was denied. 
-2-
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RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PROCEEDING 
A p p e l l a n t s e e k s a r e v e r s a l o f t h e l o w e r c o u r t ' s 
j u d g m e n t d e n y i n g t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s l i c e n s e . 
R e s p o n d e n t w o u l d h a v e t h e C o u r t s u s t a i n t h e a c t i o n o f t h e 
l o w e r c o u r t a n d a f f i r m t h e d e c i s i o n . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On o r a b o u t A u g u s t 2 0 , 1 9 7 4 , a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 9 : 0 0 
o ' c l o c k a . m . , a H ighway P a t r o l m a n , T r o o p e r Wood, o b s e r v e d t h e 
a p p e l l a n t b a c k h e r a u t o m o b i l e i n t o some p a r k e d v e h i c l e s i n a 
p a r k i n g l o t a d j a c e n t t o S t . B e n e d i c t ' s H o s p i t a l i n Weber C o u n t y , 
S t a t e of U t a h (R .26 ) . T r o o p e r Wood n o t i c e d a p p e l l a n t h a d a n . 
o d o r o f a l c o h o l a b o u t h e r p e r s o n , t h a t s h e w a s u n s t e a d y i n h e r 
w a l k , t h a t s h e was i n s u l t i n g , a n d t h a t he h a d t o g i v e p h y s i c a l 
a s s i s t a n c e t o p u t h e r b a c k i n t o h e r a u t o m o b i l e w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s 
t o w a i t f o r t h e Ogden P o l i c e t o a r r i v e a n d i n v e s t i g a t e ( R . 2 7 , 
2 8 , 5 9 ) . 
O f f i c e r N i c h o l s o f t h e Ogden P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t came 
t o t h e s c e n e , s p o k e w i t h T r o o p e r Wood, a n d p r o c e e d e d w i t h h i s 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n ( R . 2 9 , l i n e s 1 1 t h r o u g h 2 5 ; R . 3 0 ) . O f f i c e r N i c h o l s 
o b s e r v e d t h e s p e e c h o f a p p e l l a n t was s l u r r e d , t h a t s h e h a d d i f -
f i c u l t y g e t t i n g h e r d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e f rom i t s f o l d e r , a n d t h a t 
- 3 -
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the appellant further refused his request to leave the 
vehicle (R.31,37,38) . 
Officer Nichols had to forcibly remove the appellant 
from her automobile and found her uncooperative, belligerent, 
and thereafter placed her in the patrol car, placing her under 
arrest and handcuffing her (R.31, 32, 38) . 
Officer Nichols was joined by Officer Hales to aid 
in the investigation and both officers were in the police 
vehicle when Officer Hales explained the Implied Consent Law 
twice to Mrs. Hyde (R.33,34,47-49). Officer Hales noted her 
speech was sluggish, that she had an odor of alcohol about 
her person, that the appellant made several requests of the 
officers to remove the handcuffs, and that she wanted to go home, 
and that she seemed upset, irritated and on repeated occasions 
indicated that they could not arrest her on private property 
(R.49) . 
The appellant recalled being arrested,being placed in 
the police vehicle, being placed in the jail, making a phone 
call, in fact, four different phone calls (R.62), attempting 
to reach her attorney or her attorney's wife, who was also an 
-4_ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
attorney, and failing that, talked to her husband whom she 
requested to come and get her out of jail (R.57). 
The appellant refused to give up her purse and a 
hair bracket to the jail matron (R.63), that she further did 
not complete either a breath or a blood test at the request of 
the police officers. 
Appellant denied on direct examination having 
anything to drink (R.55) . 
The appellant said she wanted to leave the scene and 
the reason she resisted getting into the patrol car was because 
she wanted to go into the hospital and tell them she would not 
be at work, yet under cross-examination admitted she knew 
Officer Wood, the Highway Patrolman, had gone to the hospital 
to tell them that she would be late and that the Trooper had 
asked her to stay at the scene (R.59). 
Thereafter, appellant reasserted the fact that the 
officers were without authority to arrest her since she was 
on private property (R.60) . 
-5-
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The a p p e l l a n t a d m i t t e d on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t 
she r e c a l l e d t h e o f f i c e r t e l l i n g h e r t h a t a s a r e s u l t o f 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n she c o u l d l o s e h e r l i c e n s e ( R . 6 1 ) . However, 
she i n d i c a t e d t h a t she was c o n f u s e d b e c a u s e she t h o u g h t t h a t 
would be b e c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t (R.61) , 
The C o u r t found t h a t t h e o f f i c e r had r e a s o n a b l e 
c a u s e t o r e q u i r e t h e t e s t a t t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t 
was under a r r e s t , and t h a t t he v e r y p r e c i s e r e a s o n f o r t h e law 
was t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r or no t someone i n a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i -
t i o n was i n t o x i c a t e d . The Cour t f u r t h e r found t h a t once she 
was a d v i s e d of t h e I m p l i e d Consen t Law, any r e s p o n s e g i v e n by 
a p p e l l a n t , o t h e r t h a n an ag reemen t t o t a k e t h e t e s t , was a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e r e f u s a l , and t h a t t h e D r i v e r ' s L i c e n s e D i v i s i o n 
had a c t e d p r o p e r l y i n t h e s u s p e n s i o n . 
• • . ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL. 
I t i s r e s p o n d e n t ' s p o s i t i o n , b a s e d on t h e lower 
c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , t h a t t h e o n l y q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l 
i s whe the r o r no t r e s p o n d e n t a g r e e d t o submi t t o a s o b r i e t y 
- 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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t e s t w i t h i n t h e meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 
a s amended. ( P o i n t s A and B of a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f r e l a t i v e 
t o t h e r e a s o n a b l e t i m e o r comprehens ion of a p p e l l a n t and t h e 
i s s u e of knowing r e f u s a l a r e n e c e s s a r i l y i r r e l e v a n t s i n c e t h e 
lower c o u r t d i d n o t b a s e i t s d e c i s i o n on t h o s e i s s u e s . See 
F i n d i n g s of F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law ( R . 1 2 - 1 5 ) . ) A p p e l l a n t 
h a s r a i s e d no i s s u e s of law i n h i s b r i e f and i n two i n s t a n c e s 
ha s s t a t e d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of a c o n s t r u c t i v e r e f u s a l c o u l d no t 
have o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e she d i d n o t k n o w i n g l y o r i n t e n t i o n a l l y 
r e f u s e ( a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f , p a g e s 8 and 9 ) . 
The r e s p o n d e n t m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e i s s u e of f a c t was 
whether t h e r e was or was not a r e f u s a l and t h a t t he c o u r t ' s 
f i n d i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o a f f i r m a t i v e l y i n d i c a t e e i t h e r 
i n word or a c t i o n t h a t she would t a k e e i t h e r of t h e two r e q u e s t e d 
t e s t s was. a c o n s t r u c t i v e r e f u s a l . 
T h i s f i n d i n g was a f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e c o u r t 
who had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e a l l w i t n e s s e s and upon making 
t h a t f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n / and t h e r e b e i n g no i s s u e of law 
r a i s e d i n a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f , or p r e v i o u s l y a t t r i a l , l e a v e s 
- 7 -
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this Court without power to substitute another evaluation of 
the evidence for that of the trial court and this appeal should 
be dismissed. Pixton v. Dunn, 120 Utah 658, 660, 238 P.2d 408, 
409 (1951); see also Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 106 
Utah 278, 294, 147 P.2d 875, 878 (1944). 
Article VIII, § 9 of the Constitution of Utah, and 
Rule 72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ confer jurisdiction 
on the Supreme Court from all final judgments of the district 
courts, but limits appeals in cases at law on questions of law 
alone. The instant case involving the revocation of substantial 
rights and privileges and being in the nature of an adversary 
proceeding, is not an action in equity but rather more in the 
nature of a proceeding at law and this court would be duty bound 
to sustain the trial tourt. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS FIND SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT 
IN THE EVIDENCE. 
U n d e r U t a h Code A n n . § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , a s a m e n d e d , 
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n a t r i a l de n o v o i s v e s t e d w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n 
" t o t a k e t e s t i m o n y a n d e x a m i n e i n t o t h e f a c t s o f t h e c a s e a n d t o 
- 8 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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d e t e r m i n e whether t h a t . . . l i c e n s e i s s u b j e c t t o r e v o c a t i o n 
. . . ." The lower c o u r t h e r e i n r u l e d c o r r e c t l y t h a t t h e 
a p p e l l a n t i n f a i l i n g t o i n d i c a t e e i t h e r i n word o r a c t i o n t h a t 
she would t a k e e i t h e r of t h e r e q u e s t e d c h e m i c a l t e s t s t h e r e b y 
r e f u s e d under t h e l aw . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h i s i s a q u e s t i o n of 
f a c t . I t was r e a l l y a d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t as t o , 
Whether o r not t h e e v i d e n c e does o r d o e s n o t s u s t a i n t h a t 
f i n d i n g by J u d g e Gould , t h e t r i e r of f a c t and l aw. 
Responden t t a k e s excep t ion t o a p p e l l a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a -
t i o n on page 4 of a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s a c t e d 
summar i ly and p e r h a p s a r b i t r a r i l y , i n t h a t t h e r e was some th ing 
ami s s i n no t r e a d v i s i n g a p p e l l a n t a t t h e j a i l on. t h e i m p l i e d 
c o n s e n t l aw, and a l l e g i n g t h e o f f i c e r s l e f t t h e j a i l w i t h i n 
such t i m e a s t o no t a l l o w t h e a p p e l l a n t t i m e f o r t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of a t e s t . 
The r e c o r d does n o t s u s t a i n t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e a p p e l -
l a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t of t h e f a c t s . What t h e r e c o r d makes c l e a r , i n 
s u p p o r t o f Judge G o u l d ' s f i n d i n g s , i s t h a t a p p e l l a n t was a r b i t r a r y , 
was b e l l i g e r e n t , and in t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e o f f i c e r she d id not 
l i s t e n (R.33) ; a p p e l l a n t f u r t h e r s a i d she d i d no t have t o l i s t e n 
(R .34 , l i n e 5 ) ; and she f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s d i d no t 
__a_ 
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know what t h e y were t a l k i n g abou t (R .34 , l i n e 7) ; a l s o , t h a t 
t h e f i e l d t e s t s were g i v e n , d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of w a i t i n g f o r 
t h e phone c a l l (R.34) ; t h a t a p p e l l a n t had g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y in 
u s ing t h e phone b u t a l s o was on i t a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d of 
t i m e , a s much a s f i f t e e n m i n u t e s o r more ( R . 3 5 ) ; t h a t t h e r e had 
been c o n s i d e r a b l e t i m e t h a t t h e y were t o g e t h e r e v i d e n c e d by t h e 
f a c t t h a t t h e a r r e s t o c c u r r e d a t 9:45 o ' c l o c k a .m. and t h e 
o f f i c e r s d i d n o t l e a v e t h e j a i l u n t i l a f t e r 11:00 o ' c l o c k a . m . ; 
t h a t b o t h t h e b r e a t h and b l o o d t e s t s were o f f e r e d and a v a i l a b l e 
(R*36) ; and a t no t ime a t t h e j a i l d i d t h e a p p e l l a n t a g r e e t o 
t a k e e i t h e r t e s t (R.36) ; t h a t due t o t h e l a c k of change of 
a p p e l l a n t ' s a t t i t u d e , on a r r i v i n g a t t h e j a i l , t h e r e was no 
f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s a t t h e j a i l of t h e I m p l i e d Consent Law or 
t h e c h e m i c a l t e s t ( R . 4 1 ) . 
I t was p r o p e r l y Judge G o u l d ' s h o l d i n g t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s 
had a r e a s o n a b l e c a u s e t o r e q u i r e t h e t e s t a t t h e t i m e t h a t t h e 
a p p e l l a n t was unde r a r r e s t and t h a t t h e ve ry r e a s o n f o r t h e law 
i s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r o r n o t someone i n a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n 
was i n t o x i c a t e d . The e v i d e n c e f u r t h e r s u s t a i n s t h e C o u r t ' s 
h o l d i n g t h a t o n c e a p p e l l a n t was a d v i s e d o f t h e I m p l i e d Consent 
- 1 0 -
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Law t h a t any r e s p o n s e t h a t she made o t h e r t h a n t o t a k e t h e 
t e s t was a c o n s t r u c t i v e r e f u s a l . 
Upon h e a r i n g t h e e v i d e n c e and l i s t e n i n g t o the w i t -
n e s s e s , t h e C o u r t c o n c l u d e d a s a m a t t e r of f a c t t h a t t h e 
c o n d u c t and t h e v e r b a l e n u n c i a t i o n s , t hough i n t h e n a t u r e of 
p r o t e s t s a s t o t h e n a t u r e and v a l i d i t y o f t h e a r r e s t , or a s 
t o t h e power of t h e o f f i c e r s t o do what t h e y were d o i n g , o r 
t h a t she wan ted t h e h a n d c u f f s o f f , o r t h a t a p p e l l a n t wanted t o 
go home, a l l of such conduc t (emphas i s ou r s ) w a s , in t h e v i e w 
of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , a " r e s p o n s e " (R .64 , l i n e 1 6 ) , a n d t h a t t h e s e 
r e s p o n s e s , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t 
a p p e l l a n t knew t h a t she c o u l d l o s e h e r l i c e n s e ( R . 6 1 , l i n e s 
23-28) c o n s t i t u t e d t h e f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
f i n d i n g . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e i n t h e 
r e c o r d t o w a r r a n t t h e f i n d i n g o f t he c o u r t t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s 
conduc t a f t e r b e i n g a d v i s e d of her r i g h t s , c o n s t i t u t e d a 
c o n s t r u c t i v e r e f u s a l w i t h i n t h e meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 
4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , as amended, and t h e r e f o r e t h e r e was a 
r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s in t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e lower c o u r t ' s 
d e c i s i o n , and t h e r e f o r e t h i s Cour t s h o u l d a f f i r m . 
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POINT I I I 
THE SOBRIETY TEST UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . 1 0 
( 1 9 5 3 ) , AS AMENDED, WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE APPELLANT FOR 
A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME AND THE OFFICERS PROPERLY RESPONDED 
WITH A REFUSAL AFFIDAVIT WHERE WITHIN THAT PERIOD OF TIME THE 
OFFICER REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAT THE APPELLANT HAD REFUSED 
THE TEST BY FAILING IN WORD OR ACTION TO ASSENT TO A TAKING 
THEREOF. 
Appellant cites Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 
P.2d 877 (1969), as supporting his proposition that insufficient 
time elapsed in which appellant could make up her mind to take 
•the test. 
In the case before the Court, it is clearly distinguished 
from the Hunter case. In the Hunter case, continuous efforts 
proceeded forth for a lengthy period of time between Dr. Hunter 
and his attorney or attempt to obtain an attorney and the eventual 
phone call from a lawyer, Jerry Miller, to the Murray Jail, 
requesting that a blood test be given. The Supreme Court in 
the Hunt er case held that where the officer had agreed to the 
driver contacting an attorney before finally concluding what 
-12-
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course of action would be taken, that that granting of 
permission by the officer to the driver, once given, 
should provide adequate time for the person to reach the 
attorney of his choice and to thereafter make up their 
mind as to the chemical test to be taken. 
In the case before the Court, the record is 
complete that the appellant was disagreeable from the 
beginning, that her understanding of what was occurring 
was clear as to the request for a chemical test, that 
though she may have been confused about many things, 
including the right of arrest, on private property, the 
record is amply clear that she was disagreeable, perhaps 
not paying full attention, was angry, was upset, but made 
intelligent responses relative to wanting to go heme and 
wanting the handcuffs off, at the same time making no 
concrete or affirmative move verbally or in action to take 
a chemical test at the request of the officers. The breath-
alyzer and the blood test were offered and both available 
and the respondent submits that at this point in time the 
-13-
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officers, who had had a disagreeable time with her, in 
addition to the jail matron, were not obligated to force 
a chemical test upon the appellant. Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44.10(c) (1953), as amended, provides as follows in 
part: 
11
 (c) If such person has 
been placed under arrest and has 
thereafter been requested to sub-
mit to any one of the chemical 
tests provided for in subsection 
(a) or (b) of this section and 
refuses to submit to said chemical 
tests, the tests shall not be given 
and the arresting officer shall 
advise the person of his rights 
under this section." (Emphasis 
ours .) 
In the case at hand, the appellant was observed 
in a conduct of backing into a parked vehicle, the odor of 
alcohol on her breath, a belligerent nature, all of which 
factually in the mind of the officers indicated one who was 
operating a vehicle in the condition of intoxication, and 
the court in its findings having listened to the testimony 
of all witnesses, likewise so found the facts. In the case 
at hand, the officer provided a reasonable time and effort 
-14-
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for the appellant to contact an attorney. The testimony was 
unrebutted that there was over fifteen minutes spent on the 
phone on four different phone calls. The fact that appellant 
gave up the effort to obtain legal counsel after such an effort 
and then called her husband to come and take her home, rather 
than attempting to get an attorney, is an abandonment of that 
request on the part of the appellant and is in no way indicative 
that the officers were arbitrary or misapplying their responsi-
bility or authority as relates to the appellant in this case. 
The Hunter case, supra, should not be expanded un-
reasonably to cover cases where the arrested party either 
cannot find their attorneys, or where they abandon efforts to 
contact an attorney, or where an attorney has not been reached 
as is the case here, the party is uncooperative and the appellant 
thereafter at no time agreed to take either of the tests; the 
officer was correct in concluding that a refusal had occurred 
and the court was correct in ruling that the administrative 
• ! • • 
action based thereon was proper. 
-15-
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Appellant kept saying t ha t she wanted to go home. 
Even if appellant had said she would take the t e s t a t home, 
or if she said she would take the t e s t i f she could go home, 
i t could be considered a r e f u s a l . Preston v. Johns, 180 N.W.2d 
135 (Neb. 1970), held i t was a refusa l where the d r ive r , 
requested to take a chemical t e s t , rep l ied that he would take 
the t e s t i f and only if he would be permitted to go home after 
taking i t . 
The evidence is uncdntroverted in the case before 
the Court that the appellant was uncooperative and argumentative. 
An Iowa decision holds that a failure to cooperate is equivalent 
to a refusal. Buda v. Fulton, 261 Iowa 981, 157 N.W.2d 336 
(1968) . The Nebraska Supreme Court has held: 
"Silence in the face of direct 
inquiry as to which test should be 
administered under the circumstances 
in this case was equivalent to an 
express refusal to submit to any test." 
Johnson v. Dennis, 187 N.W.2d 605, 607 
(Neb. 1971) . 
The question has been settled that when an officer 
requests a chemical test and the driver responds with a no, 
that that is a refusal. Commonwealth v. Cheek, 451 S.W.2d 394 
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(Ky. 1970) ; Maxsted v . D e p a r t m e n t o f Motor V e h i c l e s , 14 C a l . A p p . 
3d 982 , 92 C a l . R p t r . 579 ( 1 9 7 1 ) . 
F u r t h e r , i n t h e Maxsted c a s e , t h e d r i v e r u r g e d upon 
t h e c o u r t t h e a rgumen t t h a t t h e r e was a d u t y on t h e o f f i c e r t o 
e x p l a i n t o t h e d r i v e r t h a t t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l does n o t a p p l y 
t o t h e d r i v e r f s s t a t u t o r y o b l i g a t i o n t o submi t t o some k i n d o f 
c h e m i c a l t e s t . The lower c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e 
o f f i c e r t o pe r fo rm t h i s p u r p o r t e d d u t y r e n d e r e d t h e r e f u s a l t o 
submit t o the t e s t " n o t an i n t e l l i g e n t r e f u s a l . " (Emphasis o u r s . ) 
The a p p e l l a t e c o u r t , r e v i e w i n g t h i s , h e l d t o t h e c o n t r a r y , s a y i n g : 
"Nor i s t h e r e any r e q u i r e m e n t . . . t h a t a r e f u s a l of t h e t e s t 
be ! i n t e l l i g e n t ' i n o r d e r t o t r i g g e r t he s a n c t i o n of s u s p e n s i o n 
of t h e d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . " Ld. a t 5 8 2 . 
In t h i s c a s e , t h e a p p e l l a n t knew what she was d o i n g , 
though t h e e v i d e n c e i s c l e a r t h a t h e r p e r f o r m a n c e f a l l s f a r 
s h o r t of t h e C a l i f o r n i a c r i t e r i a of an " i n t e l l i g e n t r e f u s a l . " 
I n a n o t h e r C a l i f o r n i a ca se (19 73) , t h e d r i v e r was 
a s k e d f o u r t i m e s t o submit t o a c h e m i c a l t e s t , and each t ime 
t h e r e was no s p e c i f i c answer , j u s t mere s i l e n c e ; b u t r e s p o n s e 
was g i v e n r e l a t i v e t o her h e a l t h , an eye i n f e c t i o n (and t h e 
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officer took the lady to the hospi ta l ) . Also, the driver 
asked to c a l l an a t to rney . 
The Court held that the responses of the appe l lan t , 
when made, indicated the person was aware of what was going 
on; fur ther , in making no response ( s i l ence) , or agreement 
to take the t e s t , that in fact there was a r e f u s a l . Lampman v. 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 28 Cal.App.3d 922, 105 Cal.Rptr . 
101 (November 22, 1972); hearing denied January 17, 1973, 
Respondent submits that t h i s case would sustain the action of 
Judge Gould in denying Mrs. Hyde's pe t i t ion since her conduct 
and responses were short of the s i lence involved in the Lampman 
case, though she did say many other things and do other th ings , 
at the same time f a i l i n g to submit to a chemical t e s t , properly 
requested by the o f f i c e r s . 
F ina l ly , on the issue ra i sed by the appel lant , 
c o l l a t e r a l l y , as to the nature of the a r r e s t , Funke y . Depa r tm en t 
of Motor Vehicles, 1 Cal.App.3d 449, 81 Cal .Rptr . 662 (1969), 
c l ea r ly s e t s out tha t an observance of d r iv ing , the getting out 
of the car with d i f f i c u l t y , the odor of alcohol on the breath, 
the i nab i l i t y to do simple roadside t e s t s , and s lurred speech, 
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j u s t i f i e d t h e o f f i c e r i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e d r i v e r was d r i v i n g 
w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d . 
B a s e d on s i m i l a r o b s e r v a t i o n s by t h e o f f i c e r s o f t h e 
a p p e l l a n t , t h e o f f i c e r s r e a s o n a b l y s o c o n c l u d e d , a r r e s t e d h e r , 
a s k e d h e r t o s u b m i t t o a c h e m i c a l t e s t , and s h e f a i l e d t o s u b m i t . 
T h i s c l e a r l y was a r e f u s a l a n d t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d b e s u s t a i n e d , 
CONCLUSION 
T h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t o i n d i c a t e t h a t h a d 
t h e a p p e l l a n t b e e n o f f e r e d t e s t s , a d d i t i o n a l l y , a t t h e j a i l , t h a t 
t h e r e s p o n s e o f a p p e l l a n t w o u l d h a v e b e e n a n y d i f f e r e n t t h a n a t 
t h e s c e n e . 
R e s p o n d e n t t h e r e f o r e r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h a t f o r 
t h e a b o v e r e a s o n s and a l l o t h e r s a s s t a t e d i n t h i s b r i e f , t h a t 
t h i s a p p e a l s h o u l d be d i s m i s s e d . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
VERNON B . ROMNEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
BERNARD M. TANNER 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
A t t o r n e y s f o r R e s p o n d e n t 
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